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Abstract :
In many organizations, reward decisions depend on subjective performance evalu-
ations. However, evaluating an employees performance is often di¢ cult. In this
paper, we develop a model in which the employee is uncertain about his own per-
formance and about the managers ability to assess him. The manager gives an
employee a performance appraisal with a view of a¤ecting the employees self percep-
tion, and the employees perception of the managers ability to assess performance.
We examine how performance appraisals a¤ect the employees future performance.
The predictions of our model are consistent with various empirical ndings. These
comprise (i) the observation that managers tend to give positive appraisals, (ii) the
nding that on average positive appraisals motivate more than negative appraisals,
and (iii) the observation that the e¤ects of appraisals depend on the employees
perception of the managers ability to assess performance accurately.
JEL codes: M52, M54, D82, D83
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1 Introduction
Much of the economics literature on rewards and incentives focuses on the prob-
lem of designing compensation schemes in di¤erent environments. A rich literature
shows how, for example, the employees risk aversion, the extent to which output
is veriable, the existence of multiple tasks, or the presence of team production,
should a¤ect compensation schemes. The existing economics literature pays rela-
tively little attention to how an employees performance is measured. Generally, it
is taken for granted that some (imperfect) measures of performance are available. In
practice, it is often the case that employees receive annual performance evaluations
from their supervisors. These evaluations usually form the basis for setting bonuses
or promotions.
There is a diverse business literature on performance evaluations. One strand
in this literature examines what kind of evaluations supervisors give. One well-
known nding is that many supervisors tend to give (too) positive assessments.2
This phenomenon is known as the leniency bias. Another nding is that some
managers tend to compress performance ratings.3 This is known as the centrality
bias [Motawidlo and Borman (1977)].
A second strand of the business literature shows how performance evaluations af-
fect employeesfuture performances [see, for example, Balcazar et al. (1986), Kluger
and DeNisi (1996), and Alvero et al. (2001)]. Positive evaluations are generally
found to motivate employees. Negative evaluations, on the other hand, sometimes
improve performance and sometimes deteriorate it. Steelman and Rutkowski (2004)
show that the credibility of the supervisor a¤ects the sign and the size of the e¤ect
of negative feedback on an employees future performance. More generally, there
is ample evidence that employees tend to reject feedback that is inconsistent with
their own beliefs.4
The main objective of this paper is to develop a model that explains the two
2Medo¤ and Abraham (1980) report that of 7,000 performance ratings 95 % were in just two
categories: Good and Outstanding. See also Prendergast (1999) and Jawahar and Williams (1997).
3Moers (2005), for example, nds that performance ratings on subjective dimensions are closer
to the median rating than performance ratings on objective dimensions.
4Many scholars emphasize the importance of the supervisors credibility (see, e.g., Lawler (1971),
Meyer (1975), Early (1986) and Longenecker (1997). Gibbs et al. (2004) formulated the credibility
issue as follows: If subordinates do not trust their evaluators to make informed and unbiased per-
formance assessments, then the result could be employee frustration, demotivation, and turnover.
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biases in performance ratings, and at the same time explains how performance ap-
praisals a¤ect employeesfuture performances. Although this paper does not address
the problem of the design of an optimal incentives scheme, it does illustrate that a
better understanding in the performance appraisal process is likely to contribute to
a better understanding of the working of incentive schemes.
The model we develop has four key characteristics. First, at the beginning of the
game, both the supervisor and the employee form a perception of the employees
past performance. We model this formation of perceptions by assuming that the
two agents receive private signals.5 Second, we assume that supervisors di¤er in
their abilities to assess the employees performance correctly. The motivation of this
assumption is that supervisors have been found to vary in their beliefs about their
skills to appraise their subordinates [see, for example, Napier and Latham (1986),
and Tziner et al. (2001)]. Third, we assume an environment where employees are
rewarded on the basis of their performance evaluations. So, appraisals are linked
to rewards.6 Finally, the employees ability and his e¤ort are complements. The
implication of this last characteristic is that the more the employee is condent
about his ability, the more e¤ort he exerts.
We derive several results. Our rst set of results pertains to a situation where the
employee knows his own ability. In this extreme situation, performance appraisals
only provide information about the supervisors ability to assess the employees
ability correctly. A supervisor who gives an incorrect assessment of an employees
performance loses credibility. A direct implication is that a supervisor who knows
an employees performance has no incentive to rate it incorrectly. This would only
damage his credibility. The employee would doubt whether his future performance
would be correctly assessed. For a supervisor who does not observe an employees
performance three forces are at work. First, she has an incentive to give an appraisal
that is most likely to be consistent with the employees perception. This force may
5In our model, the assumption that the employee receives a signal about his performance
amounts to assuming that the employee has imperfect knowledge about his own abilities. The
psychological literature o¤ers a huge body of evidence that this assumption is valid (see, among
others, Sedikes and Strube, 1995; Klar et al., 1996; Baumeister, 1998; Kruger, 1999; and Ackerman
et al., 2002).
6This means that we assume that the supervisor is able to commit herself to a compensation
scheme based on subjective performance evaluations. In a situation where the supervisor is the
residual claimer, this assumption is strong, as ex post she will have an incentive to pretend that
the employee did a poor job. However, in many situations supervisors are not residual claimers.
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explain the centrality bias of performance evaluations. Second, as the employees
ability and his e¤ort are complements, it is more important for the supervisor that
her evaluation is correct in case the employee is more able. This force leads to a
positive bias in performance appraisals. Finally, a less able supervisor wants to come
across as able. This gives her an incentive to give an appraisal that able supervisors
relatively frequently give. We show that this force tends to dampen the total e¤ect
of the rst two forces.
The second set of results are derived from the version of the model in which
we relax the assumption that the employee knows his own ability and thereby his
past performance. In this setting, apart from the incentives discussed above, a su-
pervisor has an incentive to give positive appraisals. The reason for this incentive
is that the employees e¤ort is an increasing function of his belief about his abil-
ity. This result explains the leniency bias often found in the empirical literature
on performance rating. The idea that supervisors give positive appraisals to boost
employees perceptions of their abilities to make them work harder is not novel.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003), for instance, show that giving a challenging task to an
employee signals condence and thereby motivates. New is that simple cheap-talk
messages may motivate employees.7 Essential in our model is that apart from boost-
ing an employees condence, the supervisor wants to show that she is capable of
assessing the employees performance. This weakens her incentive to give positive
appraisals when the employee is perceived to perform poorly. If either the super-
visor were always capable of assessing the employeesperformance correctly or the
employee had absolutely no clue about his ability, the supervisors incentive to come
across as able would vanish. In such a situation, she would always provide positive
feedback. As a result, feedback would contain no information about an employees
actual performance.
Apart from the business literature on performance appraisals, this paper is most
closely related to the literature on subjective performance appraisals [important
early papers are Bull (1987) and Gibbs et al. (1994); see Prendergast (1999) and Bol
(2009) for reviews of the literature]. Key notion in this literature is that most people
7Crutzen, Swank and Visser (2007) show that comparative cheap-talk messages may reveal
meaningful information about employeesperformance levels. However, they also show that super-
visors tend to abstain from di¤erentiating among employees.
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do not work in jobs where all aspects of an employees performance are veriable.
Repeated interaction may allow for an implicit contract in which rewards are based
on unveriable information. In practice, the problem with incentive contracts is not
only that an employees performance is not veriable for a third party. Often, it
is di¢ cult to assess an employees performance in the rst place. Then, measuring
performance requires expertise. Moreover, disagreement about the true performance
may exist. Our paper does not focus on the determination of the optimal contract
in these situations. Rather, it tries to shed light on the communication between
supervisors and employees given a specic incentive scheme. We believe that this
approach makes sense, because the persons who are responsible for performance
appraisals do not always have a say in the design of the compensation scheme.
This paper is also related to Prendergast (1993) who shows that when rms use
subjective performance evaluations an employee may have an incentive to conform
to the opinion of his supervisor. In our model, however, it is the supervisor who
has an incentive to guess the workers opinion about his performance. By guessing
correctly, the supervisor signals that she can assess the workers future performance
accurately.
Finally our paper is related to Prendergast and Topel (1993, 1996), who also
start from the premise that a managers appraisal is not fully trustworthy. In their
model, the performance appraisal may deviate from the true performance because
the manager is biased with respect to the employee. In our model, any deviation of
the performance appraisal from the true performance level is because the manager
lacks the necessary expertise to judge the workers performance.
2 The Feedback Model
Our model describes the interaction between a worker (he) and his supervisor, the
manager (she). The worker faces two kinds of uncertainties. First, he is uncertain
about how his e¤ort a¤ects his performance, and second, he is uncertain about the
managers ability to assess his performance correctly. The worker chooses e¤ort,
e, to produce output y. The extent to which e¤ort translates into output depends
on the workers ability, a: specically y = ae. There are two types of workers,
a 2 fl; hg. The prior probability that the worker is of the high ability type equals
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 : Pr (a = h) =  and Pr (a = l) = (1  ). The worker does not know his type.
However, he receives a private signal about a, s 2 fl; hg. With probability , the
workers signal is fully informative, s = a. With probability (1  ), s does not
contain any information about a. Denote by  the probability that the worker
believes that a = h after he has received signal s = h :  = Pr (a = hjs = h) =  +
(1  ) and 1  = Pr (a = ljs = h). Likewise denote by  the probability that the
worker believes that a = l after he has received signal a = l :  = Pr (a = ljs = l) =
 + (1  ) (1  ) and 1   = Pr (a = hjs = l).
There are two types of managers: t = fb; gg, with Pr (t = g) = . A good
manager, t = g, observes both a and y. A bad manager, t = b, observes neither a
nor y. The manager knows her type, but the worker does not know the managers
type. The manager takes two actions. First, before the agent chooses e¤ort, the
manager sends a message, m 2 fl; hg, about her perception of the workers ability.
We assume a natural language in the sense that by sending m = l the manager
does not decrease the probability that the worker believes that a = l, while by
sending m = h the manager does not decrease the probability that the worker
believes that a = h. Let ^ (s;m) denote the probability that the worker believes
a = h, conditional on s and m. The assumption of a natural language implies that
^ (s; h)  ^ (s; l). We sometimes refer to the probability ^ (s;m) as the workers
self-condence. Second, after the worker has chosen e¤ort, the manager assesses
the output that the worker has produced. The key feature of our model is that the
managers feedback may contain information both about the workers ability and
about her own ability to assess the workers performance correctly.
The workers payo¤ equals y  1
2
e2 if t = g, and equals y^  1
2
e2 if t = b, where
y^ is the workers expected output, conditional on the information a bad manager
possesses. A crucial assumption is that y^ is independent of the e¤ort actually exerted
by the worker, whereas y is increasing in e¤ort. The manager is assumed to aim at
maximizing the (expected) output the worker produces.
The timing of the game is as follows.
 Nature draws a and t. The manager observes t. A good manager also observes
a.
 The worker receives a signal, s, about a.
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 The manager sends a message, m, to the worker about a.
 The worker updates his beliefs about a and t.
 The worker chooses e¤ort, e, leading to output y = ae
 A good manager observes y and pays the worker y. A bad manager does not
observe y and pays the worker y^.
 Payo¤s are realized.
All priors are common knowledge, as is the probability .
Our model is a dynamic game with incomplete information. The e¤ort strategy
of the worker maps his signal about his ability and the message he received from the
manager into an e¤ort level e(s;m) 2 [0;1). A good managers feedback strategy
maps the workers ability into a message m: g (a) 2 [0; 1] where g (a) denotes the
likelihood that a good manager sends message m = h, conditional on a. A bad man-
agers feedback strategy denotes the likelihood b 2 [0; 1] with which a bad manager
chooses message m = h. Denote by ^
 
s;m;g (a) ; 

b

the workers posterior belief
that the manager is good, t = g, conditional on s and m, and given the equilib-
rium feedback strategies, g (a) and 

b . We identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
in which (i) given the posterior probabilities [^ (s;m) and ^
 
s;m;g (a) ; 

b

] and
feedback strategies of the two types of managers, the workers e¤ort choice maxi-
mizes his expected payo¤; (ii) given the posterior probabilities and anticipating the
workers e¤ort decision, the feedback strategy of each type of manager maximizes
her expected payo¤; and (iii) posteriors are based on Bayesrule whenever possible.
In our model, m is cheap talk. It is well-known that in models with cheap talk,
babbling may occur. Throughout, our focus will be on equilibria without babbling.
Let us nish this section with three comments. First, an important assumption
underlying our model is that the managers ability to observe a is perfectly correlated
with her ability to observe y (and so the ability to base the workers reward on y).
We could have avoided this assumption by adding a probation period to the model.
If at the end of the probation period, only good managers were able to assess output
and to infer ability, we would have a similar model as described above. Second, we
assume that the manager is committed to reward the worker on the basis of the
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output that has been produced. This is somewhat restrictive when the manager is a
residual claimant. Whenever the manager is not a residual claimant, say the typical
middle manager, we expect that she has few, if any, material incentives to avoid
paying his worker the proper performance wage. Third, to drive home our results
with respect to how the managers feedback inuences the workers motivation in
the simplest way, we have assumed a very simple production structure.
3 Equilibria
3.1 The worker knows his own ability:  = 1
We start the analysis with examining the case that the worker knows his own ability,
 = 1 (implying  =  = 1). In the resulting game, the worker tries to infer
information about the managers type, and the manager tries to convince the worker
that she is good.
First consider the workers e¤ort decision. The worker anticipates that his ef-
fort only increases his reward in case the manager is good. His e¤ort results from
maximizing ^
 
s;m;g (a) ; 

b

E (ajs;m) e  1
2
e2 with respect to e, yielding
e (s;m) =
^
 
s;m;g (a) ; 

b
 f^ (s;m)h+ [1  ^ (s;m)] lg

(1)
where ^ (h;m) = 1 and ^ (l;m) = 0; because  = 1 . Equation (1) shows that the
workers e¤ort is an increasing function of the posterior that the manager is good.
Equation (1) implies that the manager wants the worker to believe that he can
correctly assess the workers ability. The assumption of a natural language implies
that it is a dominant strategy for a good manager to reveal her perception of the
worker, g (h) = 1 and 

g (l) = 0. Given the equilibrium strategy of a good manager,
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Bayesrule implies the following posterior beliefs8
^
 
h; l;g (a) ; 

b

= 0
^
 
l; h;g (a) ; 

b

= 0
^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

=

+ (1  ) (1  b)
(2)
^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

=

+ (1  )b
The posteriors show that guessing incorrectly ruins a managers reputation, while
guessing correctly improves it. The extent to which a correct message improves the
managers reputation depends on the probability with which a dumb manager sends
that message. For instance, if a dumb manager rarely sends m = l (b close to 1),
then ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

is close to 1. More in particular, the higher is b, the lower is
^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

and the higher is ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

: Note that if the manager is
more likely to be competent, the strategy of a bad manager (b) is less important.
Having established how much e¤ort the worker exerts in equilibrium, the dom-
inant strategy of a t = g manager, and the posteriors, there remains to determine
the optimal response of a bad manager. Using (1) and the posteriors, it is easy to
see that always choosing m = l (b = 0) is an optimal response of a bad manager if
(1  ) l2 > h2 (3)
The left-hand side of (3) denotes the expected output when a worker receives m = l,
given b = 0. The right-hand side gives the expected output when the worker
receives m = h, given b = 0.
9 In an equilibrium with b = 0, the worker does
not infer information from m = l, ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

= , but learns the managers
type if m = h: ^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

= 1. One can show that this equilibrium requires
that  is su¢ ciently smaller than 1
2
. The reason is twofold. First, a manager who
sends the right message (so m = s) gains more credibility if m = h than if m = l.
So, relative to m = l, m = h boosts the workers condence in the manager. We
8In the special case where b = 0 and b = 1, ^
 
l; h;g (a) ; 

b

and ^
 
h; l;g (a) ; 

b

, re-
spectively are o¤ the equilibrium path. We assume that, also in this case, the wrongfeedback
message is attributed to a Bad manager rather than to a Good manager.
9Recall that e(h; l) = 0
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refer to this e¤ect as the condence in manager. Second, a high ability worker is
more productive than a low ability worker. As a result, it is more productive to
guess correctly if the worker is of the high ability type than if he is of the low ability
type. This gives an incentive to a t = b manager to send m = h. We call this the
productivity e¤ect. The only reason of a bad manager for sending m = l is that
it leads to a higher probability of being correct. We call this the playing the odds
e¤ect. The playing the odds e¤ect works in favor of giving feedback to the most
common worker type: m = h if  > 1
2
and m = l if  < 1
2
.
Given (1), always sending m = h (b = 1) is an optimal response of a bad
manager if
h2 > (1  ) l2 (4)
The left-hand side of (4) gives the expected output when a worker receives m = h,
given b = 1. The right-hand side gives the expected output when the worker
receives m = l, given b = 1. If in equilibrium b = 1, then the worker does
not infer information from m = h, so that ^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

= , but learns the
managers type in casem = l, ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

= 1. An equilibrium in which b = 1
exists for a wider range of parameters than an equilibrium in which b = 0. The
reason is that the productivity e¤ect makes sending m = h more attractive for a
dumb manager than sending m = l. As a result, the playing the odds e¤ect must
be large to compensate the productivity e¤ect.
Note that for b = 0 and b = 1 the condence in manager e¤ects are opposites:
to boost the workers condence, a manager has an incentive to send m = h if
b = 0, but has an incentive to send m = l if b = 1. The condence in manager
e¤ect is responsible for the existence of an equilibrium in which the bad manager
mixes. Such an equilibrium exists if both (3) and (4) are violated. A bad manager
is indi¤erent between sending m = l and sending m = h if
(1  ) ^  l; l;g (a) ; b l2 = ^  h; h;g (a) ; bh2, so that
b =
h2   l2 + l2
(1  ) (l2 + h2   l2) (5)
One can check that b is increasing in h and decreasing in l. These comparative
static results reect the productivity e¤ect. The benet of guessing right is higher
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if the worker is of the high ability type than if the worker is of the low ability type.
Moreover, b is increasing in . This is the playing the odds e¤ect. The higher is the
probability that the worker is of the higher ability type, the higher is the probability
that by sending m = h a bad manager guesses correctly. Finally, b is increasing in
 if and only if  > l
2
l2+h2
. The intuition for this last result is as follows. At  = l
2
l2+h2
we have that b =
1
2
. Then, the condence in manager e¤ect favors neither feedback.
For other , we have that b 6= 12 . Then, the condence in manager e¤ect pushes
b (weakly) towards
1
2
. An increase in  dampens the condence in manager e¤ect:
if  is high, the posterior beliefs of the worker hardly depends on b. Consequently,
an increase in  reduces the costs of a deviation of b deviate from
1
2
. Hence, the
larger is , the lower is b if  <
l2
l2+h2
, and the higher is b if  >
l2
l2+h2
:
The next proposition summarizes the discussion above.
Proposition 1 Suppose that in the feedback model  = 1 and  2 (0; 1). Then, on
the basis of the t = b managers strategy three equilibria can be distinguished:
(i) if (1  ) l2  h2, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists in which b = 0;
(ii) if h2  (1 )l2

, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists in which b = 1
(iii) if (1 )l
2

> ah2 > (1  ) l2, an equilibrium exists in which b is given by (5).
In equilibria (i  iii), the workers e¤ort is given by (1), the t = g managers strategy
is g (h) = 1 and 

g (l) = 0, and the posteriors are given by (2). The equilibrium
probability with which a t = b manager chooses m = h is non-increasing in l, and
non-decreasing in h and .
3.2 The Worker Does Not Know His Ability,  = 0
In case the workers signal does not contain any information about his ability, the
worker is not able to infer information about the managers type from her feedback.
Of course, in equilibrium the manager anticipates this. The main implication is
that the manager needs not to consider how her feedback impacts on the workers
perception of her type. To put it di¤erently, if  = 0, the condence in manager
e¤ect, the playing the odds e¤ect and the productivity e¤ect do not longer play a
role.
Potentially, there is a new e¤ect of feedback, however. If  < 1, the manager has
private information about the workers ability. Consequently, feedback may a¤ect
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the workers perception of his ability. We call this the self-condence e¤ect. We
now argue that if  = 0, in equilibrium, a manager always gives positive feedback:
g (h) = g (l) = b = 1. Recall that the manager gives feedback with an eye
to encouraging the worker to expend more e¤ort. Our assumption of a natural
language implies that providing negative feedback never induces a worker to have a
more positive perception of his ability than positive feedback. As e¤ort is increasing
in the workers belief about his ability, it is never optimal for the manager to send
negative feedback. Of course, in equilibrium, the worker sees through the managers
attempt to boost his perception of his ability. As a result, the managers positive
feedback has no e¤ect.
Proposition 2 Suppose that in the feedback model  = 0. Then, the unique equi-
librium is a pooling one in which:
(i) g (h) = 

g (l) = 

b = 1;
(ii) the workers e¤ort is given by (1);
(iii) the posteriors are equal to their priors.
3.3 The Workers Signal Contains Some Information, 0 <
 < 1
So far, we have distinguished four e¤ects of feedback: the condence in manager
e¤ect, the playing the odds e¤ect, the productivity e¤ect, and the self-condence
e¤ect. If 0 <  < 1, potentially these four e¤ects may simultaneously play a role.
This illustrates that the e¤ects of feedback may be quite complex.
We start the analysis by showing that if 0 <  < 1, feedback only matters in case
the worker is uncertain about the managers type. That is, we prove the following
proposition
Proposition 3 Suppose that in the feedback model 0 <  < 1 and  2 f0; 1g. Then,
the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which:
(i) g (h) = 

g (l) = 

b = 1;
(ii) the workers e¤ort is given by (1);
(iii) the posteriors are equal to their priors.
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First, suppose that the worker knows that the manager does not possess private
information about his ability,  = 0. Then, feedback does not contain information,
and it is optimal for the worker to ignore it. Now suppose that  = 1. Then,
feedback does not provide information about the managers ability, as the worker
knows that the manager is able. The only e¤ect that remains is the self-condence
e¤ect. The worker may infer information from feedback about his own ability. How-
ever, as shown in the previous subsection, if the self-condence e¤ect is the only
e¤ect of feedback, the manager has an incentive to send m = h, irrespective of
the workers type. The main message of Proposition 3 is that informative feedback
requires uncertainty about the managers ability to assess the workers ability and
his performance. Bol (2011) presents evidence that managers are more inclined to
provide biased, positive feedback to employees when their relationships are more
longlasting. It seems plausible that when time elapses uncertainty about a man-
agers ability decreases. Against this background, Bols nding is consistent with
Proposition 3.
Having established equilibrium behavior for  2 f0; 1g ; Proposition 4 describes
equilibrium behavior for 0 <  < 1.10
Proposition 4 Consider the feedback model with 0 <  < 1. Then, in any non-
babbling equilibrium such that e (s;m = l) 6= e (s;m = h) for some s 2 fl; hg we
have:
(I) g (h) = 1  b > g (l); Moreover, if b < 1, then g (l) = 0;
(II) the workers e¤ort is given by (1);
(III) ^ (s; h) > ^ (s; l) 8s 2 fh; lg;
(IV) ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b
  ^  h; h;g (a) ; b if b  (+(1 ))(1+) and ^  h; l;g (a) ; b 
^
 
l; h;g (a) ; 

b

if b  .
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 presents a wide variety of results. First, consider Part I. It shows
that a good manager who faces a high ability worker always provides positive feed-
back. If he were to provide negative feedback, he would damage his credibility
(in expected terms) and would deteriorate the workers self-condence. A good
10Numerical examples of these equilibria for this case can be obtained from the authors.
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manager, meeting a low ability worker, faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, pos-
itive feedback improves the workers self-condence. On the other hand, negative
feedback may enhance the workers condence in the manager. Finally, Part I of
Proposition 4 shows that a bad manager has weaker incentives to provide positive
feedback than a good manager who faces a high ability worker, but stronger incen-
tives than a good manager who faces a low ability worker. Of course, the reason for
this result is the playing the odds e¤ect. The odds for a positive signal matching
the signal of the worker are maximal if the manager knows that the worker is of
the high-ability type, and minimal if the manager knows that the worker is of the
low-ability type.
Part III and IV of Proposition 4 result from Bayesrule. Part III shows that pos-
itive feedback boosts the workers self-condence. Part IV describes how feedback
a¤ects the workers condence in the manager. As in Section 3.1, the sign of the
condence in manager e¤ect depends on the probability with which a bad manager
gives positive feedback. If a bad manager predominantly provides positive (nega-
tive) feedback, providing negative (positive) feedback signals being a good manager.
Together with Equation (1), Part II of Proposition 4 shows how the workers self-
condence and his condence in the manager determine e¤ort.
To gain deeper insights into the variety of e¤ects of feedback, it is convenient to
assume that  = 1
2
. In this case, the playing the odds e¤ect is canceled out. The
production e¤ect and the self-condence e¤ect give incentives to a bad manager
to provide positive feedback. The condence in manager e¤ect may temper these
incentives, but never dominates them. Hence, for  = 1
2
, b >
1
2
. Together with the
result that a good manager, facing a high ability worker, always provides positive
feedback, our model is able to explain the widely observed leniency bias: in general,
managers tend to provide positive feedback. For  > 1
2
, bad managers are even
more inclined to provide positive feedback as a result of the playing the odds e¤ect.
Only if high ability workers are rare (low ), bad managers may lean to negative
feedback. In line with our result that bad managers are more inclined to provide
positive evidence, Bol (2011) presents evidence that managers for whom it is more
costly to assess employees performances are more lenient.
Our model highlights the importance of the interplay of the workers self-perception
and his perception of the managers ability to assess his performance correctly. Neg-
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ative feedback discourages a worker who thinks highly of himself. Such a worker
would dismiss a manager who provides negative feedback as incompetent. Feedback
that is consistent with the workers self perception enhances the workers condence
in the managers ability to assess his performance. As a result, in our model negative
feedback may encourage a worker who has a low self-perception. In line with our
result, several studies have found that the e¤ect of negative feedback on a workers
performance crucially depends on the managers reputation for being able to assess
the workers performance correctly.
In our model, the manager can only send two messages. For this reason, our
model cannot provide an explanation for the centrality bias. However, our model
does suggest an explanation. It demonstrates that the e¤ects of feedback depend on
a workers perception of his managers ability to assess his performance correctly.
A dumb manager anticipates this. He has an incentive to give feedback that is
consistent with the workers own perception. In a model with, say, three messages,
a dumb manager may tend to give neutral feedback to avoid too large deviations
between feedback and the workers perception. Note that this explanation for the
centrality bias requires that especially large inconsistencies between the managers
view and the workers view on performance damage the managers reputation for
being able to assess the workers performance correctly.
4 Conclusions
In many organizations, annual performance appraisals form the basis for the rewards
employees get. In this paper, we have investigated how a managers performance
appraisal a¤ects an employees future performance. A key feature of our model is
that both the manager and the employee have a perception of the employees past
performance. We have derived a couple of results. First, we have shown that even
though a performance appraisal is cheap-talk, it may contain information that is
relevant for the employee. Second, for a wide range of parameters the manager
tend to give positive appraisals. Third, on average, a positive appraisal motivates
an employee more than a negative appraisal. Fourth, the e¤ect of appraisals on an
employees future performance depends on the employees perception of the ability of
the manager to assess his performance. Finally, our analysis suggests an explanation
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for the centrality bias. The driving force behind most of our results is that the
manager wants to come across as a person who is able to assess the performance of
the agent correctly. This gives incentives to good managers to separate themselves
from bad managers by giving informative feedback.
As usual, the results of our paper are derived from a model that is based on many
assumptions. We have made some of these assumptions to drive home our results in
a simple way. For instance, we have assumed that the good manager observes the
employees performance, while the bad manager does not have a clue. Qualitatively,
assuming that a good manager is better in assessing the employees performance
than a bad manager would have su¢ ced.
A more restrictive assumption is that the manager is assumed to reward the
employee on the basis of his perceived performance. As always, this is a restrictive
assumption in case the manager is the residual claimant. Essential for our results
is that the relationship between performance and pay depends on the managers
ability to assess the employees performance.
A limitation of our model is that it does not consider long working relationships
between the manager and the employee. This probably would make it hard for a bad
mamager to maintain a good reputation. The employee would gradually learn the
managers type. As we have shown that performance appraisals only matter when
the employee is uncertain about the managers type, we expect that in a multi-period
model the e¤ects of performance appraisals diminish over time.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
We prove each part of Proposition 4 in turn. For the proof of Part (I) we need
several lemmas.
Lemmas for Part (I): First we point out that our assumption of a natural
language which we assume throughout the paper implies g (l)  g (h) : Then
we show that it is better for the manager to match the workers private signal
with her feedback than to give the other feedback message. To do that we need
to derive the preference relations of the manager over the feedback messages, given
how the worker responds to each combination of private signal and feedback. These
preference relations are then also used in the two next lemmas which prove the
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relationships between b and respectively 

g (h) and 

g (l) : Finally we observe that
b > 0; which is the nal Lemma necessary for the proof.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium we have g (l)  g (h) :
Proof. By our assumption of a natural language we have ^ (s; h)  ^ (s; l) for
all s 2 fh; lg : We will show that ^ (s; h)  ^ (s; l) implies g (h)  g (l).
^ (h; h) =
(+(1 ))(g(h)+(1 )b)
(+(1 ))(g(h)+(1 )b)+(1 )(1 )(g(l)+(1 )b)
^ (h; l) =
(+(1 ))((1 g(h))+(1 )(1 b))
(+(1 ))((1 g(h))+(1 )(1 b))+(1 )(1 )((1 g(l))+(1 )(1 b))
^ (l; h) =
(1 )(1 )(g(h)+(1 )b)
(1 )(1 )(g(h)+(1 )b)+(1 )(+(1 )(1 ))(g(l)+(1 )b)
^ (l; l) =
(1 )(1 )((1 g(h))+(1 )(1 b))
(1 )(1 )((1 g(h))+(1 )(1 b))+(1 )(+(1 )(1 ))((1 g(l))+(1 )(1 b))
Then ^ (h; h)  ^ (h; l) implies, after cross-multiplications of the denominators
and simplication,
 
g (h) + (1  )b
  

 
1  g (l)

+ (1  ) (1  b)
  

 
1  g (h)

+ (1  ) (1  b)
  
g (l) + (1  )b


 
g (h)  g (l)

((1  ) (1  b) + (1  )b + )  0

 
g (h)  g (l)
  0
and the result follows for s = h. The same steps will prove that ^ (l; h)  ^ (l; l)
implies g (h)  g (l).
We now turn to the question whether a manager wants to match the private
signal of the worker.
Lemma 2 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6= e (s; h) for some
s 2 fh; lg ; then (e (l; l)  e (l; h)) > 0, (e (h; h)  e (h; l)) > 0 and (e (l; l)  e (l; h)) <
0, (e (h; h)  e (h; l)) < 0:
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose not. Then without loss of
generality there exist k; k0 2 fh; lg ; with k 6= k0; such that
(e (s = k;m = k)  e (s = k;m = k0))  0  (e (s = k0;m = k0)  e (s = k0;m = k)) :
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By e (s00; l) 6= e (s00; h) for some s00 2 fh; lg at least one of these inequalities is strict.
That implies that with positive probability m = k0 is strictly better than m = k;
while m = k0 can never lead to a worse result. Thus any manager would strictly
prefer m = k0 to m = k and we have a babbling equilibrium: a contradiction.
Before we can proceed with the next lemma we need to derive the preference
relations over the feedback messages by the managers, given e (s;m), s;m 2 fl; hg :
Given the feedback strategies anticipated by the worker, b and 

g (a), we rst
consider the conditions for which a manager is willing to send m = l: Note that  =
Pr (s = h) ;  = Pr (a = h j s = h) = Pr (s = h j a = h) and  = Pr (a = l j s = l) =
Pr (s = l j a = l) : The bad manager is willing to send m = l only if
8<: Pr (s = l) e (s = l;m = l)E (ajs = l)+Pr (s = h) e (s = h;m = l)E (ajs = h)
9=; 
8<: Pr (s = l) e (s = l;m = h)E (ajs = l)+Pr (s = h) e (s = h;m = h)E (ajs = h)
9=;
(1  ) e (l; l)E (ajs = l) + e (h; l)E (ajs = h)  (1  ) e (l; h)E (ajs = l) + e (h; h)E (ajs = h)
(1  )E (ajs = l) (e (l; l)  e (l; h))  E (ajs = h) (e (h; h)  e (h; l)) (6)
Similarly, if a = h; a good manager is willing send m = l only if
(1  ) e (l; l)h+ e (h; l)h  (1  ) e (l; h)h+ e (h; h)h
(1  ) (e (l; l)  e (l; h))   (e (h; h)  e (h; l)) (7)
For a = l; a good manager facing a low ability worker is willing to send m = l
only if:
 (e (l; l)  e (l; h))  (1  ) (e (h; h)  e (h; l)) (8)
The bad manager is willing to adopt a mixed strategy if and only if (6) holds with
equality. If (6) is violated, the bad manager strictly prefers to send m = h: The
same applies for a good manager with respect to (7) if a = h and with respect to
(8) if a = l:
We can now show that a worker will put in more e¤ort if the feedback message
matches his private signal.
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Lemma 3 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6= e (s; h) for some
s 2 fh; lg : Then (e (l; l)  e (l; h)) > 0:
Proof. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 2 (e (l; l)  e (l; h)) < 0 and thus
(e (h; h)  e (h; l)) < 0: As (1  ) <  we obtain that g (l) < 1 implies g (h) = 0.
By Lemma 1 this implies that g (l) = 

g (h) and 

g (h) 2 f0; 1g : It follows that
g (h) = 

b ; as the worker would believe that the manager is bad, whenever he
observes a message which cannot be observed from a good manager. This would
constitute a babbling equilibrium: a contradiction.
This enables us to prove the nal three lemmas which together will prove Part
(I).
Lemma 4 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6= e (s; h) for some
s 2 fh; lg : Then b > 0 implies g (h) = 1:
Proof. Here we show, by contradiction that the good manager facing a high
ability worker will strictly prefer m = h if the bad manager is willing to send
message m = h. Suppose not. Then (6) either holds with equality or is violated
while (7) holds. By Lemma 3 this implies that
(1  )E (ajs = l)
E (ajs = h) 
(e (h; h)  e (h; l))
(e (l; l)  e (l; h)) ; and
1  

 (e
 (h; h)  e (h; l))
(e (l; l)  e (l; h)) :
Combining yields
(1  )E (ajs = l)   E (ajs = h) (1  )
Note that
E (ajs = l) = l + (1  ) (h  l)
E (ajs = h) = l + ( + (1  )) (h  l)
 =  + (1  )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which gives us
(1  ) (l + (1  ) (h  l)) ( + (1  ))   (l + ( + (1  )) (h  l)) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) l  0
By  < 1 and ; l > 0 this cannot hold. Thus, if b > 0; then 

g (h) = 1:
In a similar way, the following lemma can be derived.
Lemma 5 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6= e (s; h) for some
s 2 fh; lg : Then b < 1 implies g (l) = 0:
Proof. Suppose not. Then (6) holds while (8) is either violated or satised with
equality. Thus

1   
(e (h; h)  e (h; l))
(e (l; l)  e (l; h)) 
(1  )E (ajs = l)
E (ajs = h)
E (ajs = h)  (1  )E (ajs = l) (1  )
 (l + ( + (1  )) (h  l)) ( + (1  ) (1  ))  (1  ) (l + (1  ) (h  l)) (1  )
h  0
By ; ; l > 0 this cannot hold, which proves the lemma.
Now we only need to prove that b is strictly positive, and the results will follow.
Lemma 6 Consider a non-babbling equilibrium in which e (s; l) 6= e (s; h) for some
s 2 fh; lg : Then b > 0:
Proof. If not, then either b = 

g (l) = 

g (h) = 0 or 

g (l) = 

b = 0 < 

g (h) :
In the former case, we would have a babbling equilibrium: a contradiction. In the
latter case a bad manager could get the best possible result by sending feedback
message h: She would convince the worker that she is a competent manager and
convince the worker that he is able. Clearly sending message m = l would have
strictly inferior e¤ects. Thus b > 0:
Proof of Part (I): Lemmas 6 and 4 implies 0 < b  g (h) = 1: By Lemma 5
we obtain g (h) = 1  b > g (l) and that b < 1, then g (l) = 0.
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Proof of Part (II): this follows from the derivation of (1).
Proof of Part (III): Note that as feedback from an informed manager holds
information (g (h) > 

g (l)) while the feedback of the bad manager contains no
information, on average it is informative. Thus ^ (s; h) > ^ (s; l) 8s 2 fh; lg :
Proof of Part (IV): There are two cases. The rst case is g (l) > 0; implying
that the bad manager always sends message h: In that case the results follow immedi-
ately, asm = l can only be sent by the good manager. Thus ^
 
s;m = l;g (a) ; 

b = 1

=
1; and the manager is seen as fully credible.
The second case is that g (l) = 0:We start by showing that ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b
 
^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

if b  (+(1 ))(1+) :
Note that Pr (s = h) =  + (1  ) = : Using this we obtain the following
probabilities and posteriors:
Pr (s = l ^m = l ^ t = g) = (1  )  ( + (1  ) (1  ))
Pr (s = l ^m = l ^ t = b) = (1  ) (1  ) (1  b)
and thus ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b

=
(1  )  ( + (1  ) (1  ))
(1  )  ( + (1  ) (1  )) + (1  ) (1  ) (1  b)
;
and
Pr (s = h ^m = h ^ t = g) =  ( + (1  ))
Pr (s = h ^m = h ^ t = b) = (1  )b
and thus ^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b

=
 ( + (1  ))
 ( + (1  )) + (1  )b
:
Now we can rewrite ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b
  ^  h; h;g (a) ; b  0 as:
(1 )(+(1 )(1 ))
(1 )(+(1 )(1 ))+(1 )(1 )(1 b)
  (+(1 ))
(+(1 ))+(1 )b
 0
b (1+) (+(1 ))
(1 (1 )b (1 ))( (1 )b (+(1 )))
 0
Observe that the denominator is negative as (1  (1  )b    (1  )) is
positive and   (1  )b    ( + (1  )) negative. Thus ^
 
l; l;g (a) ; 

b
  
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^
 
h; h;g (a) ; 

b
  0 if and only if b (1 + )  ( + (1  ))  0: This holds if
b 
( + (1  ))
(1 + )
:
Now we show in the same way that ^
 
h; l;g (a) ; 

b
  ^  l; h;g (a) ; b if
b  . The probabilities and posteriors are
Pr (s = h ^m = l ^ t = g) = (1  )  (1  )
Pr (s = h ^m = l ^ t = b) = (1  ) (1  b)
and thus ^
 
h; l;g (a) ; 

b

=
(1  )  (1  )
(1  )  (1  ) + (1  ) (1  b)
;
and
Pr (s = l ^m = h ^ t = g) =  (1  ) (1  )
Pr (s = l ^m = h ^ t = b) = (1  ) (1  )b
and thus ^
 
l; h;g (a) ; 

b

=
 (1  ) (1  )
 (1  ) (1  ) + (1  ) (1  )b
:
Thus ^
 
h; l;g (a) ; 

b
  ^  l; h;g (a) ; b if
(1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )+(1 )(1 b)
  (1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )+(1 )(1 )b
 0
 b
(1 (1 )b (+(1 )))( (1 )b (1 ))
 0
Note that the denominator is negative as (1  (1  )b    ( + (1  ))) is
positive and (  (1  )b    (1  )) is negative. Thus the condition becomes
b  
This concludes the proof.
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